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1. INTRODUCTION
In most advanced economies it is unlawful for employers to discriminate against 
individuals either directly or indirectly on grounds of race, either in their recruitment 
practices or once an individual has become an employee.1  Despite anti-discrimination 
legislation numerous studies suggest that employers do discriminate on grounds of race. 
One set of studies identifies discrimination by seeking to control for differences across 
workers in wage regressions, treating remaining racial differences as evidence of 
discrimination. Another set use audit studies/field experiments to identify employer 
discrimination in recruitment by submitting made-up curricula vitae differing only by 
race to real job vacancies. Those studies identify a reduced likelihood of an employer 
"call back" for black applicants relative to identical candidates whose race can be inferred 
as "white". However, the first type of study is often limited by the lack of individual level 
productivity measures, while the second type only identify possible discrimination at one 
early stage in the hiring process.  
There are various sources of discrimination in the labour market. Becker (1957) 
emphasises employers' taste-based discrimination, but also notes that customers and 
employees may discriminate. Arrow (1972, 1973) and Phelps (1972) emphasise 
asymmetry of information as a source of discrimination.2 In the absence of information 
on the productivity of prospective employees, employers rely on group statistics as 
evidence on which to base their hiring decisions. As noted by Levitt (2004: 433) “in 
1 There are exceptions. Policies of "positive discrimination" and "affirmative action" may permit employers 
to discriminate in favour of minority groups who are identified as particularly disadvantaged in the labour 
market. 
2 For a recent review of these theories and their ability to account for racial differences in labour market 
outcomes see Lang and Lehmann (2011). As the authors point out, the presence of prejudiced employers 
can lead to differential impact of search frictions across race groups, helping to explain black-white 
differences in equilibrium unemployment and employment. 
0 
general, empirical tests have a difficult time distinguishing between taste-based and 
information-based models of discrimination”.   
This paper contributes to the literature in this dimension as we are able to 
differentiate between taste-based and statistical discrimination theories in a labour market 
context. Charles and Guryan (2008) provide evidence that at the State level, prejudice 
matters and negatively affects the wages of black workers. In our set-up we can directly 
identify employer taste-based discrimination since productivity is measured at no cost for 
each potential employee, wages are set outside the firm, firm production is simply 
additive in each worker and firms do not have customers. As such, all the potential 
channels of discrimination are blocked apart from employer taste-based discrimination, 
which in this environment is not unlawful (information regarding the workers employed 
remains private to the firm) and can be fully satisfied. The environment is similar to a 
laboratory experiment but with the advantage that employers’ decisions are observed for 
months. We observe the dynamic of discriminatory behaviour, as more information on 
the potential workers’ productivity is revealed overtime, and workers can be sacked/hired 
at low cost.  
Our study is based on the analysis of the virtual labour market created by the 
Fantasy Premier League (FPL), an on-line competition based on the English football 
Premier League entered by about 2.5 million individuals each season.3 The aim of 
participants in the FPL is to assemble and manage the best performing team in the fantasy 
league, something that is achieved by accumulating points related to the performance of 
professional footballers on the pitch. Employers hire their initial team and can 
3 For further details check: http://fantasy.premierleague.com/ 
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subsequently buy and sell players in any game week during the 38 week season. This 
initial squad choice at the start of the season is the focus of our first set of analyses.  Our 
first dependent variable is the number of times a player is hired. For subsequent weeks 
the data at our disposal are the weekly net demand for a given player after productivity 
information and price have been updated. 
Our analyses examine what role, if any, workers' race plays in employers' choice 
of their squad at the start of the season and their subsequent decisions to recruit and retain 
players each week of the season, conditional on their productivity and other factors.  
While the popular press has reported cases of racial discrimination between footballers 
and from fans in English football, we find no racial differential in employers' choice of 
their squad either for the start of the season or in subsequent weeks as more accurate 
productivity information becomes available. These results suggest taste-based 
discrimination is absent when fantasy league employers hire workers.  
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section Two reviews the 
previous literature on racial discrimination in the labour market and other markets.  
Section Three presents our data and the institutional setting for the empirical analysis. 
Section Four outlines our empirical strategy. Section Five presents results and Section 
Six concludes. 
 
2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
There are a variety of reasons as to why employers discriminate on grounds of 
race. Profit maximising employers may exploit the labour market vulnerability of certain 
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groups of workers, such as illegal migrants, by offering them employment at lower wages 
than other workers vying for the same positions, leading to an increased propensity to be 
taken on but at a lower wage than might otherwise be the case. Alternatively, employers 
may have a "taste" for employing individuals "like" themselves, in which case white 
employers are engaged in what Becker (1957) termed "taste-based discrimination" when 
they offer jobs to whites before non-whites regardless of their aptitude for the job. In such 
circumstances, employers may pay a price for their taste-based discrimination if their 
recruitment or promotion procedures are based on skin colour rather than aptitude or 
productivity. Becker argued that the price of such discrimination is not sustainable in the 
long-run in competitive markets. Another possibility is that, in the absence of information 
on prospective employees' worth, employers may judge the quality of applicants based on 
group characteristics, such as age or race, resulting in what has been termed "statistical 
discrimination" (Arrow, 1972, 1973; Phelps, 1972). 
Studies capturing perceptions of racial discrimination in the labour market suggest 
it remains commonplace, a finding which is supported by depth interviews with 
employers themselves (see Pager and Shepherd (2008) for a review). Reviewing audit 
studies which identify racial differentials in hiring rates, Altonji and Blank (1999: 3194) 
conclude: "the studies to date generally suggest that hiring discrimination continues to 
occur". These studies typically send CVs that differ only in the implied race of the 
applicant to real job openings. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) for example, find 
substantial racial discrimination in call-backs, which is uniform across occupation, 
industry and employer size. This finding has been replicated in studies using a similar 
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set-up.4  These field experiment studies are clean in the sense that they are able to isolate 
the role of race on hiring through the manipulation of curricula vitae, but they suffer from 
the fact that no actual hiring takes place. What they observe instead are 'call-backs' or 
offers; i.e. discrimination at an early stage of the recruitment process.  In our data real 
hires occur.5 In this sense, our setting is similar to Goldin and Rouse's (2000) study 
which used real auditions for musicians and found women were more likely to be hired in 
a blind audition when the employers could not see the sex of the musician. In a laboratory 
experiment Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) find employers discriminate on racial grounds, 
but only in the case of applicants whose qualifications mean the hiring decision is a 
difficult one.6  
It is only recently that discrimination studies have sought to distinguish between 
statistical and taste-based discrimination. List (2004) shows sports-card traders from 
minority groups receive lower initial and final offers than those from majority groups.  In 
four complementary follow-up experiments exogenously manipulating information on 
race he finds the observable differences in treatment are due to statistical discrimination.  
Similarly, Zussman (2013) experimentally manipulates information on the race of online 
car buyers and sellers in Israel and finds discrimination against Arab buyers and sellers is 
statistical rather than taste-based.  Doleac and Stein (2013) adopt similar techniques in 
the online sale of iPods in the United States: they conclude that discrimination against 
black sellers is due to statistical discrimination rather than taste-based discrimination.  
4 See Bendick (2007) for a review of audit studies providing evidence of employment discrimination on 
grounds of race. 
5 As in the case of most audit and correspondence studies, we lack information on the identity of the 
employer so we are unable to test for exophobia and endopheilia (Feld et al., 2103). 
6 Charness and Kuhn (2011) summarize the experimental literature on discrimination. In the laboratory, 
racial discrimination appears to stem mostly from stereotyping. 
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Both Zussman (2013) and Doleac and Stein (2013) point to distrust across groups as the 
cause of such behaviour, which is also consistent with Pope and Sydnor's (2011) 
evidence that black borrowers face higher interest rates in peer to peer lending. To our 
knowledge, our study is the first to seek to isolate taste-based discrimination in a labour 
market setting. 
Turning to the sports literature on racial discrimination, the consensus is that 
racial discrimination has declined over time.  Reviewing the wage discrimination 
literature for the United States, Rosen and Sanderson (2001: F58) suggest that the 
discrimination which "was easily detected in the initial studies of the 1960s and 
1970s...had mostly disappeared by the 1990s...It is difficult to find a negative coefficient 
on race in US data these days". Kahn (2009) suggests that the racial discrimination on 
compensation in basketball found in early studies disappeared over time, although there 
is some evidence of an unexplained black-white salary shortfall among elite players 
(Hamilton, 1997). Further, two studies on hiring decisions for marginal workers suggest 
no racial bias against players or coaches in basketball (Brown et al., 1991; Kahn, 2006). 
However, in their review of the sports literature through to the late 1990s Altonji and 
Blank (1999: 3196) argue that there is evidence of salary discrimination, especially in 
professional basketball, some customer discrimination against minority players, and 
"some hiring discrimination, although these results depend on the sport and position [of 
the player on the field]". 
There also appears to be some diminution in the degree of customer 
discrimination. An early study identified racial discrimination in the value of baseball 
cards traded by individual collectors (Nardinelli and Simon, 1990). The price paid for 
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black and Hispanic retired baseball players is lower than that for whites conditional on 
career performance statistics.7  However, a more recent paper finds no such price 
differential (Bodvarsson and Brastow, 1999).  
Racial discrimination may be less apparent than it used to be because black 
players have been integrated into North American professional sports. Goff et al. (2002) 
treat the integration of black players into North American baseball and basketball as akin 
to the diffusion of a productivity-enhancing technology. Consistent with this proposition 
they show black players were more productive than white players during the quarter 
century over which sports moved from a segregated to an integrated equilibrium. The 
productivity differential dissipates post-diffusion.  
Most of the empirical studies of racial discrimination focus on North American 
labour markets, especially the sports literature. However, there is one study that focuses 
directly on racial discrimination in English professional soccer.  Szymanski (2000) shows 
that teams with a higher share of black players have higher performance controlling for 
payroll expenditures, a finding which is consistent with racial discrimination. Whereas 
Szymanski uses payroll expenditures to proxy for talent, we have direct match-by-match 
time-varying data on individuals' on-field labour productivity, measured across a variety 
of dimensions. 
 
 
 
7 Unlike their study which captures customer discrimination, our private individuals are picking players in 
order to win and they are in competition with others. 
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3. DATA AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
3.1 Institutional Set-up 
We analyse the virtual market of the Fantasy Premier League (FPL); an on-line 
game based on the Barclays Premier League, which is the top flight of professional 
football in England. FPL is played by about 2.5 million individuals who sign up to play 
the game in the course of a season. Participation in the FPL is free. On subscribing, 
participants are given a fictional budget of £100 million from which they must purchase a 
squad of fifteen professional footballers playing in the league8. The price of players is set 
by the FPL and reviewed every week. Like in a real firm, different positions must be 
filled. Here, a team must consist of two goalkeepers, five defenders, five midfielders and 
three strikers. These players are real footballers playing professional football in the 
Barclays Premier League. Participants in the FPL are employers in the sense that they 
buy and sell the players they need in order to produce points and win the league. The 
overall winner is the team with the most points at the end of the season, or over a month 
for the monthly prizes. It is also possible to enter teams in private leagues, so as to 
compete amongst friends. These competitions create incentives for FPL participants to 
maximize the number of points scored throughout the season, even when an overall win 
is no longer possible. 
As well as selecting their initial squad, employers are able to fire and hire new 
workers after each game, subject to budget constraints.  The cost of a hire is the value of 
the incoming player plus the gap between the value of the outgoing player on the open 
8 There are roughly 600 players to choose from in a given season.  They cannot hire more than three 
footballers playing for the same club in the Premier league. 
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market and the value the employer recovers on sale (which is not the full market price).9 
Employers are permitted one transfer per week which does not affect their accumulated 
points total. Any additional transfers entail a deduction of four points, which must be 
added to the financial cost of making a transfer. Once a year, FPL participants are 
allowed to hire an unlimited number of footballers with no points penalty.  
The points scoring system, i.e. the production function of our firms, is presented 
in Appendix Table A1. Footballers score points for playing in that particular week, for 
the time spent on the pitch, and for the actions they perform (positive points for goal 
scoring, assists and the like, and negative points for own goals, and disciplinary offences 
leading to red and yellow cards) and bonus points for overall performance. Bonus points 
are awarded to the best three players in each game, again based on some pre-determined 
metrics (see Table A1).Productivity is thus objectively measured.  
Demand for particular players reflects what is known about their on-field 
performance, i.e. their productivity, as well as their cost to the employer – as determined 
by the market value of the player set by FPL – and employers’ personal preferences. 
Employers have excellent information on each player’s on-field performance across the 
dimensions described in Table A1, both in previous years when the season starts and in 
the past games as the season progresses. As such, information about the productivity of 
each potential worker improves over time, and is available to all firms. Importantly to 
study racial discrimination, the summary information presented for each footballer 
contains a colour picture, as well as his position, team, the proportion of other employers 
9 There is a gap between the buying and selling prices of players. This margin is half of the difference 
between the current price and the price at which the player was bought; this can be thought as a tax on the 
value added. As such, transferring players has a financial cost and leads to a reduction in the firms’ budget. 
So firms may not always optimize their teams and may refrain from using their weekly transfer.  
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who have that player in their squad, his performance in recent matches, his current 
market value, upcoming fixtures, the number of games the player is scheduled to play this 
week (usually one, but sometimes, zero or two) and an injuries update. This is illustrated 
in Figure A1 for Emmanuel Adebayor. These pictures were used to determine the race of 
each footballer, using a dichotomous categorisation: white, non-white.10  
Seven features of this setting mean that we can recover more precise estimates of 
racial discrimination in relation to hiring than is possible in other settings.  First, we are 
able to identify the effects of taste-based employer discrimination, as opposed to the 
effects of customer, co-worker or statistical discrimination. There is no possibility of 
customer discrimination since employers do not have clients.11 Team production is 
simply additive in individual workers' production; the absence of co-worker relations 
means there is no co-worker discrimination. It also means that we can ignore the 
importance of productivity spill-over across footballers, which would complicate 
recruitment and retention decisions by bringing in factors other than individual talent. 
Employers have access to very comprehensive weekly data on the productivity histories 
of all workers in the industry, together with their market prices, so their information set 
regarding worker value is much richer than would ordinarily be the case. Since the 
productivity of each worker (not only of employees) is perfectly known, at least as the 
season progresses, there is no scope for statistical discrimination. Employers also know 
the skin colour of all workers in the population of potential recruits: it is not just proxied 
by name as in most field experiments (Bertrand et al, Mulainathan, 2004, for example).  
10 There are few players defined as other races – for the analysis they have been grouped with black 
players. This ethnicity variable was defined by three individuals and race determined by a simple majority 
rule. 
11 In a real world setting customer discrimination can affect team selection via crowd attendance at games 
(Bryson et al., 2014). 
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They are therefore able to account fully for the performance of workers and their race in 
decisions concerning recruitment and retention.  Thus, if there are any indications of 
racial bias, they are unlikely to reflect anything but employer taste-based discrimination.  
Second, employers are free to discriminate in their hiring and firing behaviour. In 
this sense we are "turning back the clock" to a time when employers faced no legal 
impediments to discrimination.  Therefore the costs of discrimination are low and we can 
thus identify an unbiased taste for discrimination.   
Third, the setting is a single occupation in a single industry, so workers are 
perfectly substitutable for one another (within a position on the field), and the full 
productivity history of workers is available at no cost; i.e. there is no monitoring cost. 
Thus, this study can overcome the problem that, in many observational studies, it is 
difficult to compare "like-for-like" workers.   
Fourth, as in a laboratory experiment, the firms are identical in size, technology 
and initial budget. In assembling the workers required by the firm, employers must fill 
identical job slots within the firm. At the beginning of the year all employers face the 
same budget constraint, so their ability to recruit a mix of more and less talented workers 
is identical at the outset, although budgets vary as the season progresses due to value 
added (destroyed) when selling workers.  
Fifth, although firms are in competition with one another, workers are able to 
work at more than one firm simultaneously so that firms are not in direct competition 
with one another for worker talent. Thus, in principle, all workers are available for hire, 
subject to firms' budget constraints.  
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Sixth, workers have no say in the firms they join and can only exit if fired, so 
there is no selection of workers into more (less) discriminating firms.12  
Finally, employers are price takers: the price of recruiting individual workers, i.e. 
a sign-on fee, varies substantially but individual employers are unable to influence these 
prices. Prices attached to workers are exogenous to the firm, but relate very strongly to 
worker performance, as we shall see. As such, firms cannot exploit minority workers by 
offering them lower sign on fees. Once signed, there are no wages in our set up.  
 
3.2 Does the FPL function like a normal labour market? 
Before we investigate the racial differences in player hires we need to establish 
whether the FPL functions like a labour market. Evidence to this effect is presented in 
Figure 1.  Panel A shows that better performing players in the previous season are valued 
more highly at the start of the new season. Panel B shows that demand for players, as 
measured by the number of times a player is picked for initial squads, rises steeply with 
performance in the previous season.  The steep non-monotonic rise in price and demand 
for high-performing players evident in Panels A and B is consistent with a market for 
superstars, as originally conceived by Rosen (1981). The discontinuity is at 180 points, 
which represents the top 10% performers. Unsurprisingly, the initial demand/initial price 
plot follows a similar, albeit smoother, trajectory (Panel C). The remaining two panels (D 
and E) look at the same relationships as the season progresses. Previous week 
productivity is positively correlated with demand and change in price. Overall, the FPL 
12 Worker selection based on perceptions of discriminatory tendencies in particular occupations or among 
certain employers may contribute to wage discrimination.  For example, Plug et al. (2014) find gays and 
lesbians in Australia shy away from more prejudiced occupations. 
11 
 
                                                 
appears to behave like a labour market, where more productive workers are in higher 
demand and command higher fees  
[FIGURE 1] 
3.3: Data Description 
Each week, the FPL participants select the 11 players from their 15 man squad 
who will score points for their fantasy team depending upon their performance in real 
football games played that week, as well as a captain whose productivity will be doubled. 
The data available to us only cover the number of employers who have a given footballer 
on their books, not whether this player has been selected to score points for the team. In 
that sense, our set up is similar to audit studies in that we have information on employees  
not employers. We share with these studies the lack of knowledge on the characteristics 
of employers, but survey evidence amongst the population of fans attending Premier 
League games during the season 2008/09 suggest that 8% were non-white, while ethnic 
minorities represent 14% of the UK population.13 Football fans in England are thus 
disproportionally white. However, while based on the English Premier League, the FPL 
is open to anybody. 
We have match-by-match data on players' performance as indicated by the FPL 
scoring system of all footballers registered in one of the 24 football teams playing in the 
Premier League in the three seasons 2008/09, 2009/10 and 2010/11.14 This gives us a 
13 http://www.epfl-europeanleagues.com/changing_face.htm and 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-england-and-
wales/rpt-ethnicity.html. 
14 The English Premier League is composed of 20 clubs each season.  At the end of the season, the bottom 
three are dropped (relegated) and replaced by the best performing teams from the Championship league.  
We only observe 24 teams since Newcastle United and West Bromwich Albion were relegated at the end of 
the 2008/09 season but gained promotion to play in the 2010/11 season. 
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total of 1,767 footballers, about 600 per season. Since the Premier league starts before the 
transfer window for professional footballers is closed, not all footballers are available to 
be picked for the first game. Subsequently, professional teams can transfer players in 
January, and players from their academy may join the league during the season. As such, 
only 1,327 players are available for pick in week 1.15 Each club plays 38 games in the 
season. We have thus an unbalanced panel of 60,086 player-match observations. Thirty-
six per cent of potential employees are non-white, two and half times  above the 
percentage of non-white in the English population as a whole.16  
The player performance data available to all employers comes from FPL, which 
runs the fantasy league. Players' productivity is based on rudimentary objectively 
verifiable data of their performance in a game, as explained above and in Appendix Table 
A1. Individual points in a given week range between -6 and +32 with a mean of 1.50.17 
Points scored by players is of interest in its own right since we can establish to what 
extent there are any racial differences in the productivity of players. Table 1 and Figure 
2D report no difference in weekly performance by race. Over the full season, total 
productivity is also very similar between white and non-white players, with the average 
player scoring about 40 points. Note however that the superstar footballers are 
disproportionally white: whites represent 78% of the top 1% performers (Figure 2A).  
[TABLE 1] 
[FIGURE 2] 
15 That is 444 players in season 2008/09 and 2009/10 and 239 in season 2010/11. 
16 Szymanski (2000: 597) notes that there were only 4 black players playing in the 38 English professional 
football clubs in his data in 1974.  By 1993 black players were much more common, accounting for around 
8 per cent of his sample. 
17 Not all footballers play in a given week, so the mode score is actually zero. 
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Time on the pitch enters our performance metric. But this could itself be a 
function, in part, of racial discrimination among "real world" Premiership coaches if their 
decisions regarding who to play and how long to play them for are racially biased, either 
because they are responding to customer preferences for white players, or because they 
are indulging their own taste-based discrimination or statistical discrimination. There is, 
however, little evidence of racial differences in playing times; whites are marginally less 
likely to play but conditional on playing, play for a few more minutes. These two inputs 
appear to compensate for one other so they are unlikely to contribute to any variation in 
overall productivity. 
We find little evidence of differences in productivity between players of different 
races, supporting Goff et al.'s (2002) observation that top-flight professional sports are 
racially integrated. The second main determinant of demand for a player is price. Prices 
are set by the FPL and appear to be a function of performance and net demand (see 
below). At the beginning of the season, price ranges between £3.9 million and £14 
million (Christiano Ronaldo) and, on average, non-white players are marginally more 
expensive at the outset. Indeed the distribution of initial price is slightly shifted to the 
right for non-white players (Figure 2B) This is surprising considering that there is no 
difference in productivity but may reflect the fact that players differ along racial line on 
observable characteristics. Non-whites are more likely to have been present in the league 
last season, as such there is less uncertainty about their productivity.  They are also more 
likely to be non-British nationals, more likely to have played for their national team and 
to play at least once in the season. More importantly, they play in different positions. 
Non-whites are more likely to play as forwards, the most expensive players on average 
14 
 
and they are least likely to be goalkeepers, the least expensive players on average.18 
Below we come back to this issue of whether the set prices are fair. After the initial 
valuation, players’ prices are reviewed on a weekly basis. In any week, 80% of prices 
remain the same, and weekly price adjustments are in general small.  These distributions 
are almost identical by race (Figure 2E) but non-whites loose marginally more value than 
white players in any given week (-0.007 vs -0.005) . 
Table 1 also reports the mean of the two outcomes of interest: initial demand and 
weekly net flow. The number of times a player is chosen by employers in their initial 
squad is only available for the 2009 and 2010 seasons. On average, there are 70,000 picks 
for a white player and 60,000 for a non-white but this difference is not statistically 
significant. The distributions of initial demand are almost indistinguishable but note that 
at the top end, there are only white players. There is no difference in net transfers and the 
distributions are perfectly super-imposed.19 Based on these descriptive statistics there 
appears to be little evidence of discriminatory behaviour amongst FPL participants. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
We investigate two potential dimensions along which racial discrimination may 
occur, namely initial hires at the start of the season and transfers during the course of the 
season. There may be discrimination in the labour market if, conditional on performance, 
employers are simply less likely to purchase non-white players at a given price. Since all 
18 Lang and Lehmann (2011) discuss constraints on employer ability to discriminate when potential 
working populations are heavily skewed racially. Even for the most racially biased position, goalkeeper, 
non-whites represent 10% of the potential employees. 
19 The mean net transfer is positive as some participants join the FPL during the season. Those late 
participants buy 15 players and do not sell any, leading to a small positive net demand overall. 
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other channels of discrimination are blocked, racial differences in hires will arise through 
taste-based discrimination in the way Becker envisaged (see Altonji and Blank, 1999: 
3170). As Kahn (2009: 14-15) notes, identification of racial bias in hiring and firing 
decisions is best investigated using performance differences of marginal workers, as 
opposed to the average worker because only the former is informative about the margin 
where the hiring/firing decision is made. This is precisely what we observe in our data 
since all players are available for hire by all employers at any point in time, and can be 
dismissed with the low dismissal costs described in Section Three. 
First we investigate whether there are any racial differences in employers' squad 
choice for the start of the season and, if so, whether they can be accounted for by 
performance in the previous season, initial price and other observable characteristic of the 
player. If a player is new to the league and has no information on performance in the 
prior season, values for previous season metrics are set to zero and the observations 
identified with a dummy variable set to unity for players new to the league. This category 
is a mix of young players, players who used to play in lower leagues (especially those of 
promoted teams) and players who previously played abroad. We thus estimate a 
regression of the (log) number of initial picks for each professional footballer, accounting 
for race, a quadratic in price, a quadratic in previous year performance and the player’s 
characteristics.  
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑖 = 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖2 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖2 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (1) 
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level, so as to capture correlation in 
the popularity of a player between seasons. Additional robustness checks estimate this 
model using quantile regressions rather than ordinary least square. 
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Second, we investigate the determinants of employers' net demand for players, 
that is, the difference between the number of hires and the number of fires a player is 
subject to each week, as participants to the FPL are allowed to revise their team.  
There are three reasons to suspect that discriminatory behaviour of employers 
may diminish over the course of the season. First, as Antonovic et al. (2005: 923) note in 
the context of The Weakest Link TV show, "the implicit cost of taste-based discrimination 
rises as the game progresses (because one's probability of winning the game is higher in 
later rounds) discriminatory outcomes due to taste-based discrimination should diminish 
over time". Intensified competition should limit such behaviour in the FPL for the same 
reasons. Second, whereas at the start of the season employers must rely on player 
performance information from the previous season, employer information about player 
performance is continually up-dated throughout the season such that, if there is any 
uncertainty regarding productivity at the outset that could induce some statistical 
discrimination, this dissipates over time as employers observe player’s "form", including 
that of footballers they have not selected such that the information on productivity is 
perfect and covers the full set of employees and potential employees.  Third, there may 
be attrition in the employers remaining active in the league if, for example, it is those 
who are most committed to winning, or have the greatest chance of winning, who 
continue to hire and fire to the end of the season. Figure 3 shows movement in the net 
demand for players over the course of the 38 week season for the pooled seasons.  It is 
apparent that market activity declines over the course of the season, perhaps reflecting 
falling effort as most employers find they are unable to win, or growing employer 
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perceptions that they have optimised in the face of budget constraints.20 The sudden drop 
before week 20 is likely due to the Christmas holiday season. If we assume that 
discriminatory behaviour is costlier for these employers still playing towards the end of 
the season (since under-performance via discrimination is most keenly felt by these 
employers) differential attrition should mean discrimination declines over the season. For 
all these reasons we should expect diminishing discriminatory behaviour as the season 
progresses. As well as flexibly controlling for time, we run robustness check splitting the 
season into four periods.  
[FIGURE 3] 
We isolate race-related differences with a dummy variable identifying non-white 
players. The specification includes the same individual characteristics as in (1), plus 
indicators of weeks of play, to capture potential fluctuation in participants’ interest 
through the season, and an indicator on the number of games scheduled to play during the 
week (usually one, but sometimes zero or two). Fees are the updated values after last 
performance. The measures of productivity capture various time dimensions. A priori, 
employers may use different productivity metrics, and face a trade-off between using 
recent productivity which may capture some random luck component, or use a long term 
average which may fail to capture recent change in player’s form. We include three, 
covering different periods: the immediate productivity (last period performance), the 
three previous periods, and the overall performance since the season started. Considering 
20 We are unable to identify individual employers in our data so we are unable to assess the direct effects of 
employer attrition. 
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that we have repeat observation for players, standard errors are again clustered at the 
player level.21 
∆𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑡−2/4 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖1/𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
𝑓(𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (2) 
Finally, to absorb any remaining characteristics of the player that may not be 
captured by these observables, we also estimate a player/season level fixed effect. The 
race effect is then identified through its interaction with performance and price; i.e. are 
non-white players more likely to be traded than white players at a given level of recent 
performance or price.  
∆𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑡−2 4⁄ + 𝛽5𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖 1/𝑡 −1 + 
𝛾2𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑡−2/4 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖1/𝑡−1 ∗
𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (3) 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Graphical Evidence 
Figure 4 presents information on the relationship between performance, price and 
demand for players by race, both at the start of the season and during the season.  As 
shown from Figure 2, it is notable that there are only white players towards the very top 
of the rankings in terms of last season's performance, raising questions as to whether one 
can recover a white-nonwhite differential in demand conditional on performance at the 
very top of the performance scale. Where there appears to be common support the 
21 We also estimated models with standard errors clustered at the player/season level, but results were very 
similar and are not reported here. 
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association between initial demand for players at the start of the season and their 
performance in the previous season appears very similar by race (Panel A). Note that 
while the relation between performance and pick is linear there is a definite kink for top 
performers. The same is also true during the course of the season, with demand rising 
with points for both whites and nonwhites in a similar fashion, at least up to the higher 
reaches of the points distribution, after which point the number of player observations is 
very small (Panel C). Similarly, throughout most of the points distribution the association 
between player performance and price is similar by race, both at the start of the season 
(Panel B) and during the course of the season (Panel D), but while the pricing of 
performance is linear for whites, for non-whites it tails off at very high weekly 
productivity levels.   
[FIGURE 4] 
5.2 Racial Differences in Outcomes Other than Employer Demand for Players 
As Table 1 shows, white and non-white players differ in observable traits in ways 
which may also influence players' propensity to be chosen for starting squads.  It is 
therefore sensible to move to a multivariate framework in which we can control for racial 
differences in observable traits which might obscure employers' propensity to 
discriminate. Table 2 presents results for eight different outcomes - four related to players 
at the beginning of the season, and four outcomes that unfold during the course of the 
season. It is apparent that, conditioning on the observable player and team traits displayed 
at the bottom of the table, there are no racial differentials with respect to the various 
20 
 
dimensions of footballers’ productivity.22 The only statistically significant differential is 
that non-white players are valued at around 2 per cent less than observationally 
equivalent white players at the beginning of the season (row 1), something that remains 
over the season, since there is no difference in price change as the season unfolds (row 
5).23  Since we control for initial price in most regressions, this differential will not affect 
our estimates of discrimination in hiring. 
[TABLE 2] 
5.3 Initial Squad Selection 
Table 3 presents our first main set of findings on log hires at the start of the 
season. There is no racial differential in initial hires when comparing raw hiring rates 
(column 1), a finding that holds conditioning on player's position, age, birth place, 
international caps status and club playing for in the Premier League (column 2).  
However, initial price plays a big part in whether a player is selected by employers for 
their initial squad, as we saw in Figure 1 Panel C.  When we condition on initial price we 
find non-white players are more likely to be selected than white players.  This positive 
discrimination is likely related to the initial under-pricing of non-white players.  
However, the non-white coefficient falls in size with the addition of player performance 
in the previous season, such that the racial differential is no longer statistically significant 
(column 5). When including both price and productivity measures, initial demand is 
driven by past productivity but not price. However, players for which past productivity is 
unknown, because they did not play in the Premier League last season, are also more 
22 For points accrued this week and minute played conditioning on having played does not alter these 
conclusions. 
23 We are not privy to the algorithm used by FPL to determine prices. 
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popular. This may be driven by well-known foreign players joining the league and 
benefiting from a halo effect. 
 [TABLE 3] 
The distribution of initial pick is characterised by a large bulk of players with very 
low number of hirings and a long tail of super-stars attracting a large fraction of 
participants – note that the pricing is such that participants can only afford a few super-
stars due to their budget constraint. Thus, we assess whether the racial differential in 
hiring differs at different points of the hiring distribution. Table 4 reports estimates of 
quantile regressions estimated for the following quantile: 10, 25, 50, 75 and 90. While the 
point estimates are consistent with some discrimination happening amongst the 
superstars, these differences are not statistically significant. Note, that the positive effect 
of not having a productivity record is driven by very popular players.  
[TABLE 4] 
Finally, we estimate our favoured specification (Table 3, Column 5) for different 
subsamples. First, we differentiate for having played in the Premier League previously. 
Our prior would be that for individuals who haven’t played, there is more uncertainty 
about their productivity such that potential employers may revert to some type of 
statistical discrimination. Second, we split the sample by previous productivity to test 
whether variation in the penalty for discrimination faced by employers (in term of lost 
inputs) affects their discriminatory behaviour. Third, we split the sample by position on 
the field since productivity and racial composition differ by position. Lastly, we split the 
panel by nationality, as employers may be more likely to discriminate against non-white 
foreigners than against non-white nationals. Table 5 displays the results of these tests of 
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heterogeneity in the racial gap in hiring. In most instances the non-white coefficient is 
positive but it is only statistically significant in the bottom quartile of last year's 
performance distribution where non-white players are substantially more likely to be 
picked. Overall, we find no evidence to suggest that employers are discriminating on 
grounds of race when making their first hires for the season. 
[TABLE 5] 
5.4 Net employer demand for players 
We now turn to net employer demand for players over the course of the season. 
An advantage of our set-up is that we can observe the dynamics of hiring and firing. This 
is important since as more information about contemporaneous productivity of employees 
and prospective employees become available, employers may revise their hiring 
decisions.  
[TABLE 6] 
Although net demand for non-white players is lower than it is for white players, 
the difference is quantitatively small and statistically non-significant in the absence of 
controls (Table 6, column 1).  The non-white coefficient becomes positive but remains 
statistically non-significant when we introduce controls for player characteristics and 
three measures of productivity: performance in the last game, performance in the 
previous three games, and total points accumulated in the games up until that point. Note 
that hiring/firing decisions appear to be primarily based on the most contemporaneous 
measure of productivity, even so this measure, to a large extent, may be affected by 
chance. The coefficient becomes negative when conditioning on player price in column 3 
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but, again, it is far from statistically significant. The picture remains the same when 
additionally conditioning on the number of times the player was picked for squads at the 
start of the season, as this affects the number of future transactions (column 4). In column 
(5) we test whether employer demand reacts differently to productivity information 
depending on the race of the player. None of the interactions are significant but the main 
race coefficient turns statistically significant. However, the effect is still small: being 
non-white would be related to an decrease of almost 2,000 participants who own a non-
white player. This is 0.18 of a standard deviation in net trade. Finally, moving to a fixed 
effects model (Column 6), a small negative effect between being non-white and 
accumulated points in the season is apparent when incorporating player fixed effects 
(column 6) but again this is not economically relevant.   
There is little evidence of racial differentials at the mean, and also very little at 
any of the quantiles in the net transfer distribution (Table 7). Demand for non-white 
players is statistically significant at the 90th percentile but again the effect is so small as 
to be economically negligible.  
[TABLE 7] 
Finally, in Table 8 we test for heterogeneous effects in discrimination across sub-
populations using specification 3 of Table 6. First, we restrict the sample to footballers 
who actually played at least once in the league during the season. Second, we assess 
whether individuals for whom less information on past productivity was available 
(because they did not participate in the league in the previous season) are more or less 
likely to be discriminated against as productivity information is revealed. Third, initial 
pick is likely to affect the potential subsequent net transfers so we split the sample into 
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quartiles of initial picks. Fourth, since the racial composition differs by position, we 
separately estimate the regression for each position. Fifth, we split the sample between 
national and non-national players. Sixth, we test whether, as expected, discrimination 
decreases over time for reasons presented above: costs of discrimination, selection of 
participant, more valid productivity information. On all these dimensions we find little 
evidence of racial discrimination (Table 8). The only statistically significant effects are 
the lower likelihood of keeping non-white players among i) those in the third quartile of 
the distribution of the initial squad demand, and ii) those for which no productivity 
information was available at the beginning of the season. Both of these effects are small. 
Although there are theoretical grounds for suspecting the race coefficient to vary over the 
course of the season, there is no empirical support for this proposition. 
[TABLE 8] 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We have examined whether there are racial differences in hiring rates in a setting 
where we can discount the possibility of discrimination on grounds other than taste-based 
discrimination.  This setting is a virtual labour market for professional football players.  
The players are real: they play each week in England's top professional league, the 
Barclays Premier League.  However, the market for their services is virtual: it is an on-
line game where participants operate as employers, buying and selling players in order to 
win the fantasy football league.  The setting is particularly attractive because the football 
players do not play together once picked, so there is no opportunity for co-worker 
discrimination; the employers have no customers, so there is no consumer-based 
25 
 
discrimination; and employers have perfect knowledge of individual players' time-
varying labour productivity, precluding the possibility of statistical discrimination. What 
is more, there is no legal bar to employers exercising any taste for discrimination they 
may possess, making the costs of such discrimination lower than they are in the real 
world. If taste-based discrimination is an important component in employers' hiring 
decisions, we would therefore find it here. In addition to our ability to isolate the impact 
of taste-based discrimination, our setting has a number of other very attractive features 
including identical firms with identical budgetary constraints; the substitutability of 
football players for one another (at least within position on the pitch); players are 
simultaneously available for hire by multiple firms; fees for employees are exogenously 
given; and players have no choice as to whether they are hired by an employer or not. 
We find no evidence of racial discrimination in hires, either at the start of the 
season, when employers pick their initial squad, nor during the course of the season. 
Productivity is the main driver of hiring/firing decisions. A rare occurrence of 
discrimination is in the hiring/firing of employees who are new to the league and for 
which productivity information at the beginning of the season was not available. 
However, this effect while statistically significant is very small. 
 The finding of no discriminatory behavior against non-whites is consistent with 
other studies which suggest that racial differences in market outcomes are not driven by 
taste considerations. Instead other factors are at play. For example, a number of studies 
point to the importance of statistical discrimination (List, 2004; Zussman, 2013; Doleac 
and Stein, 2013) while others, such as Plug et al. (2014), emphasize the importance of 
worker sorting based on perceptions of discrimination in certain occupations or among 
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particular types of employer. Since those channels are closed in our setting, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that we do not find any evidence of discrimination.  Our findings are also 
consistent with studies which point to a diminution in the extent of racial discrimination 
in sports on the part of employers and fans. The difference in discriminatory behaviour 
between the sport context and the general labour market is likely to be driven by the 
availability of good productivity measures for all possible employees in the sports labour 
market, something that is clearly not possible in the general labour market. 
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Figure 1: Does Fantasy League function like a market 
A: Last year Productivity and Initial 
Price 
 
 
B: Last year productivity and Initial 
Demand 
 
 
C]: Initial Price and Initial Demand 
 
 
 
Note: Own calculation based on Fantasy Football 
League 2008/09, 2009/10 2010/11 
 Shaded area represent the 95 per cent 
confidence interval 
D: Productivity and change in Price: 
 
  
 
E: Productivity and net employer 
demand 
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Figure 2: Racial Differences in Performance, Price and Demand: 
 
A] Last Year Performance by Race 
 
 
B] Initial Price by Race 
 
 
C] Initial Demand by Race 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fantasy Football League 2008/09, 
2009/10 2010/11 
 
 
D] Weekly Performance by Race 
 
 
E] Weekly Price Change by Race 
 
 
F]: Weekly Net Demand by Race 
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Figure 3: Market activity per week 
 
 
Note: Own calculation based on Fantasy Football League 2008/09, 2009/10 2010/11. 
Market activity is the sum of all the absolute net transfers in a given week 
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Figure 4: Racial Differences in market relationship: 
 
A] First Picks by Race and Previous 
seasons Points  
 
 
B] Initial Price and last year 
performance by race 
 
 
Fantasy Football League 2008/09, 2009/10 
2010/11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C] Net Demand and Performance 
 
 
 
D] Change in Price and Performance 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: 
 
 
Weekly varying variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fantasy Football league 2008/2011 
***, **, * reflect statistical difference of the means for the two groups at the 99%, 95% 
and 90% confidence  
a Number of picks is only available for season 2009/10 and 2010/11, the sample size is 
thus White (751) non White (416). 
b Conditional on being in the league last year: sample size: White (712), non White (444). 
 
  
 White  Non-White 
Fixed characteristics mean s.d.  mean s.d. 
Price at t=1 5.239 1.404 
 
5.403** 1.274 
Nbr of picks at t=1a 70779 129493 
 
60226 100267 
Points last year 40.751 51.833 
 
42.944 48.517 
Top decile points last yearb 0.104 0.306  0.070** 0.255 
Not in league last year 0.367 0.482 
 
0.308** 0.462 
Non UK national 0.482 0.500 
 
0.664*** 0.473 
Age 26.610 5.131 
 
26.079** 4.505 
International cap 0.586 0.493 
 
0.651*** 0.477 
Defender 0.317 0.466 
 
0.333 0.472 
Forward 0.147 0.354 
 
0.266*** 0.442 
Goalkeeper 0.159 0.366 
 
0.030*** 0.170 
Mid fielder 0.377 0.485 
 
0.371 0.483 
Never played in Season 0.160 0.367  0.109*** 0.312 
Nbr Observations 1125  642 
Played in Game 0.478 0.500  0.502*** 0.500 
Minutes played \if played 77.15 0.233  73.54*** 0.304 
Points 1.508 2.569  1.499 2.525 
Change in Price -0.005 0.037  -0.007*** 0.038 
Net Transfer 123 11,441  72 10,777 
Nbr Observations 38,059  22,027 
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Table 2: Racial Differences in Outcomes: 
 
 Coefficient s.d. R2 
Season fixed variable    
Ln initial Price -0.019** 0.008 0.79 
Never played during season 0.000 0.014 0.19 
Duration of play during season 19.986 53.296 0.34 
Total number of points during season -2.118 2.240 0.37 
    
Time varying variable    
Weekly change in Price -0.0005 0.0005 0.092 
Played this week -0.003 0.018 0.122 
Points accrue this week -0.104 0.077 0.076 
Minute played this week -0.470 1.772 0.113 
Note: Estimate of race effects on separate regressions.   
The specification for season fixed variables includes: total points last year, value last 
year, not in league last year, season indicator, a quadratic in player’s age, position, UK 
nationals, international status (English and other), club indicator. The sample size is then 
1327 and the standard errors are clustered at the player level.  
The specification for time varying variable include: player’s characteristics, season, game 
week and number of games played in that week (0, 1, or 2). For weekly change in value, 
we also include a quadratic in points accrue in the previous week and initial value. 
Standard errors are then clustered at the player level and sample size is 58,759.  
 
  
32 
 
Table 3: OLS- Log Hires at the Start of the Season 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Non-White 0.025 0.095 0.214** 0.073 0.102 
 (0.127) (0.119) (0.102) (0.087) (0.087) 
Initial Price 
  
1.396*** 
 
0.152 
 (0.181) (0.193) 
Initial Price Square 
  
-0.050*** 
 
0.002 
   (0.010)  (0.011) 
Points previous season    0.025*** 0.025*** 
    (0.002) (0.003) 
Points previous     -0.024* -0.042*** 
season2/1000    (0.012) (0.005) 
Not in league last year    0.785*** 0.738*** 
    (0.180) (0.185) 
Constant  10.333*** -0.424 -0.119 5.429*** 5.467*** 
 (0.080) (1.747) (1.504) (1.313) (1.447) 
Controls?  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  883 883 883 883 883 
R-squared  0.00 0.21 0.37 0.50 0.51 
Note: OLS estimates: Controls are: season dummy; player's position; quadratic in age; 
UK born; England international; international of another country, and club at which 
playing. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Quantile Regression of log Initial Hire 
 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
      
Non-White 0.142 0.128 0.162 0.068 -0.256 
 (0.148) (0.127) (0.105) (0.130) (0.174) 
Initial Price 0.617* 0.653** 0.190 -0.148 0.002 
 (0.409) (0.277) (0.264) (0.274) (0.313) 
Initial Price Square -0.023 -0.028* -0.003 0.018 0.007 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
Points previous season 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Points previous  -0.009 -0.034* -0056** -0.081*** -0.076*** 
season2/1000 (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
Not in league last year 0.138 0.423 0.845*** 0.959*** 1.228*** 
 (0.238) (0.263) (0.310) (0.293) (0.346) 
Constant  2.517 5.044*** 6.105*** 7.000*** 9.637*** 
 (2.273) (1.804) (1.17) (2.107) (2.412) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.33 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.27 
Note: Quantile estimates are estimated simultaneously: Controls are: season dummy; 
player's position; quadratic in age; UK born; England international; international of 
another country, and club at which playing. Standard errors are obtained by bootstrap 
(100 replications) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample size: N=883. 
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Table 5: OLS – Log Initial Hire – Test for Heterogeneity  
 
Population Non-White R2 N 
Played in FF last season 0.119 (0.091) 0.57 706 
Did not Play in FF last season 0.084 (0.307) 0.35 177 
Points last season: Quartile 1 0.625*** (0.232) 0.41 137 
Points last season: Quartile 2 0.209 (0.173) 0.36 190 
Points last season: Quartile 3 0.217 (0.238) 0.35 180 
Points last season: Quartile 4 0.014 (0.135) 0.44 199 
Defender 0.039 (0.147) 0.48 304 
Forward 0.037 (0.238) 0.63 154 
Goalkeeper -0.001 (0.529) 0.74 99 
Midfielder 0.203 (0.147) 0.53 326 
UK national 0.054 (0.148) 0.52 402 
Non-UK national 0.120 (0.113) 0.54 481 
Note: The non-White column reports the estimates on the coefficient for non-white 
players in a log initial hire model whose specification is identical to the one defined in 
Table 3, column(5). Standard errors, in parentheses, account for clustering at the player 
level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
35 
 
Table 6: OLS - Net Employer Demand for Players 
 (1) 
OLS  
(2) 
OLS  
(3) 
OLS  
(4) 
OLS  
(5) 
OLS  
(6) 
FE  
Non White -51.61 41.06 -71.68 -106.31 -1976.3*  
 (93.53) (103.25) (105.59) (137.51) (1144)  
Points last   1244*** 1244*** 1323*** 1229*** 1166*** 
game  (101.26) (101.33) (125.32) (137.84) (133.73) 
-- *non-white     41.22 25.42 
     (194.40) (186.66) 
Points in   251.9*** 265.7*** 302.7*** 249.8*** 267.2*** 
previous 3 
games 
 (39.68) (39.67) (51.86) (52.13) (52.51) 
-- *non-white     44.65 78.09 
     (75.09) (78.39) 
Total Points   -60.84*** -49.39*** -40.49*** -46.78*** 0.54 
Accumulated  (5.49) (5.25) (7.71) (6.41) (8.28) 
-- *non-white      -7.38 -22.82* 
     (9.02) (12.72) 
Player price    -4822.2*** -4585.8*** -5217.9*** -77665*** 
after last game   (581.69) (705.79) (666.98) (7231.68) 
-- *non-white      1130.48 -7109.70 
     (761.7) (10363.1) 
N picks for     -383.51***   
starting squads    (73.60)   
Constant  125.6* 3962.9*** 8139.7*** 9953.4*** 8715.9*** 131455*** 
 (69.75) (1274.36) (1395.21) (1759.6) (1472.21) (10451) 
Controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  0.00 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 
Note: Controls are season dummy; player's position; quadratic in age; UK born; England international; 
international of another country, club at which playing, game week, indicators of number of games played 
in the week. Nbr of observations = 58,319 or 38,511 in (4). Standard errors are clustered at the football 
player level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 7: Quantile Regression: Net Employer Demand for Players  
 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
      
Non-White -19.05 2.72 -1.73 1.06 1.99** 
 (20.42) (7.03) (2.40) (1.39) (0.88) 
Ln Price -10,703*** -2,743*** -455.7*** 24.37** 79.60*** 
 (371,70) (115.06) (28.25) (10.79) (13.10) 
Points 463.77*** 223.18*** 162.42*** 649.76*** 1,562*** 
 (19.76) (7.27) (4.55) (24.45) (95.31) 
Points in previous 3  -24.18* 4.22 11.25*** 52.43*** 424.60*** 
games (13.12) (3.78) (1.50) (5.08) (28.29) 
Points accumulated up 
to  -60.85*** -23.88*** -7.39*** -3.64*** -1.10*** 
t-4 (2.69) (0.87) (0.25) (0.25) (0.20) 
Constant  14,749*** 3,615*** 702*** 130*** 60.57 
 (598) (174) (46) (20) (20) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.17 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.27 
Note: Quantile estimates are estimated simultaneously: Controls are season dummy; 
player's position; quadratic in age; UK born; England international; international of 
another country, club at which playing. game week and indicators of number of games 
played in the week. Nbr of observations = 58,319 
Standard errors are obtained by bootstrap (100 replications) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 8: OLS - Net Employer Demand for Players – Test for Heterogeneity  
Population Non-White R2 N 
Played at least once during season -92.834 (114.22) 0.12 52,275 
Not in league last year -308.858** (153.68) 0.14 16,913 
Initial Selection: Quartile 1 36.405 (33.30) 0.07 9,556 
Initial Selection: Quartile 2 -101.789 (72.43) 0.07 9,654 
Initial Selection: Quartile 3 -287.846** (120.12) 0.13 9,673 
Initial Selection: Quartile 4 470.882 (474.40) 0.18 9,628 
Defender -99.478 (117.64) 0.14 19,425 
Forward -423.888 (273.14) 0.13 10,907 
Goalkeeper 115.86 (229.45) 0.13 6,516 
Midfielder 41.146 (194.35) 0.13 21,471 
UK national 6.004 (131.18) 0.12 26,005 
Non-UK national -109.24 (146.076) 0.12 32,314 
Week 2-10 263.03 (355.26) 0.23 12,898 
Week 11-19 -300.75 (241.86) 0.12 13,746 
Week 20-29 -315.18 (227.80) 0.10 16,202 
Week 30-38 89.81 (198.18) 0.08 15,473 
Note: The non-White column reports the estimates on the coefficient for non-white players in a net-transfer 
model whose specification is identical to the one defined in Table 5, column(3. Standard errors, in 
parentheses, account for clustering at the player level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1: POINTS SYSTEM IN FANTASY FOOTBALL 
 
ACTION POINTS 
Playing up to 60 minutes  1 
Playing 60 minutes or more   2 
For each goal scored by a goalkeeper or defender  6 
For each goal scored by a midfielder  5 
For each goal scored by a forward  4 
For each goal assist  3 
Clean sheet by a goalkeeper or defender  4 
Clean sheet by a midfielder  1 
For every 3 shot saves by a goalkeeper   1 
For each penalty save  5 
For each penalty miss - -2 
  
For every 2 goals conceded by a goalkeeper or defender -1 
For each yellow card  -1 
For each red card  -3 
For each own goal  -2 
Bonus points for the best players in a match 1/3 
 
 
BONUS POINTS: 
The three best performing players in each match according to the Bonus Points System 
will receive additional bonus points. 3 points will be awarded to the highest scoring 
player, 2 to the second best and 1 to the third. The Bonus Points System is based on 
statistics on various dimensions of the player’s performance collected by OPTA 
(http://www.optasports.com/). 
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APPENDIX FIGURE A1 
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